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At the turn of the twentieth century, a large number of Europeans, mostly from Italy and
Spain, left their homelands and headed to the distant shores of Argentina in response to
the good economic opportunities, fertile land and hopes for a better future that were to
be found there. At the time, Argentina was one of the most vibrant world economies.
Between 1870 and 1930, around seven million people migrated from Europe to
Argentina, although nearly three million returned at some different point during those
years. Also foreign capital responded to the opportunities offered by Argentina, and
British financial institutions funded an important part of the construction of national
infrastructure needed to support growth. In contrast, European migration to Argentina
virtually stopped in the 1950s, and in the next 30 years or so the country become a net
exporter of professionals who were fleeing economic decline, poor opportunities and
authoritarian regimes. Moreover, during this period, financial capital steadily left
Argentina looking for safer places. Nowadays, and in contrary to the flow of people a
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century ago, Argentineans are leaving in large numbers to Spain, Italy and other
destinations. Emigration this time is associated with the collapse of the country’s
currency experiment of the 1990s which left a legacy of massive output decline, high
unemployment, financial crisis and lost hopes.
This paper investigates the main patterns of international migration to and from
Argentina in the twentieth century by examining the effects of relative income
differentials, persistence effects, economic cycles and political regimes.
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1 Introduction
International migration is like a barometer of the economic and societal conditions in
home countries with respect to the rest of the world. Poor economic performance, lack
of employment and of wealth-creation opportunities, weak respect for civil and
economic rights prompt the emigration of nationals. Conversely, good economic
opportunities, jobs and open policies to migrants act as a magnet for immigration from
abroad.
The case of Argentina is a very interesting, albeit dramatic, story of a country that
switched from being the net importer of people and capital in the first few decades of
the twentieth century to the net exporter of workers, professionals and financial capital
to the rest of the world in the latter part of the century. Immigration and emigration
patterns (particularly immigration flows from Europe) followed the long-run
development cycle of growth and prosperity early in the century, followed by lagging
growth performance and the recurrent crises that have characterized the Argentinean
economy (with exceptions) since at least the 1930s. Argentina has also lived through a
pattern of volatile politics, with democracy and authoritarian regimes alternating during
the period from the 1930s to the 1980s. The last phase of these political cycles is
democracy which has prevailed since 1983. Diminished economic prospects in
conjunction with volatile politics have turned Argentina into a net emigration country in
recent years.
This was in contrast with the last decades of the nineteenth and the early twentieth
century when Argentina received mass migration from Europe, chiefly from Italy and
Spain, induced by the prospects offered by a country with vast unexploited land and
ample opportunities for exporting grain, meat and other staples, coupled with liberal
policy toward international migration. Immigration slowed down in the early inter-war
period, resumed again in the mid-1940s until the early to mid-1950s when, given the
recovery of Europe and the looming economic decline of Argentina, it virtually stopped.
Since the 1950s immigration from Europe has been replaced by an influx from
neighbouring countries. Thereafter, due to declining economic performance and
unstable and often non-democratic politics, there has been a steady process of
emigration of Argentinean professionals, scientists and intellectuals.
Market-oriented reforms have been attempted since the mid-1970s with more intense
efforts in the 1990s. In spite hopes that these policies would recreate the prosperity that
Argentina once enjoyed, efforts were often tampered by frequent macroeconomic and
debt crises, as exemplified by the collapse of the currency board experiment in 2001-02.
It left a legacy of output collapse, high unemployment and a severe financial crisis.
These developments have prompted a new wave of emigration from Argentina to Spain,
Italy and other countries, in reverse direction of the immigration flows from Europe
until the 1950s.
The purpose of this paper is to look at the main economic and political determinants of
migration flows to and from Argentina in the twentieth century. The paper is organized
in four sections in addition this introduction. Section 2 provides the main stylized facts
of migration patterns, development cycles and political regimes in Argentina during the
twentieth century from an international perspective; section 3 looks at the main
conceptual issues regarding the economic and political determinants of international2
migration relevant to this study. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis based on
econometric estimates of net immigration equations for Argentina based on time series
for various periods of the century. Section 5 concludes.
2 International migration to and from Argentina in the last century
The last 130 years or so of economic and political history in Argentina are a fascinating
period for studying issues of international migration. The period of 1870-1914 has been
labelled by economic historians as Argentina’s belle époque (see Diaz Alejandro 1970;
Bunge and Garcia Mata 1931; Cortes-Conde 1979; Taylor 1994a). This was a period of
rapid economic growth, large inflows of foreign capital and massive immigration from
Europe. Emigrants came mainly from Italy and Spain, accounting for nearly 80 per cent
of total migration to Argentina (see Bunge and Garcia Mata 1931). Massive
international migration in that period reflects the diminishing economic opportunities in
Spain, Italy and other European economies. Argentina, in contrast, had abundant land,
scarcity of labour as well as of entrepreneurship (to a extent), and a dynamic export
industry of grain and meat, oriented mainly to the British market.
In addition to inflows of people, the country received significant flows of foreign
capital, mainly from England through bonds that helped to finance the domestic
infrastructure in the second half of the nineteenth century until 1914. Foreign capital
provided the resources to build and upgrade railroads, ports and roads. Foreign
immigration, in turn, provided the labour and entrepreneurial capacity for seizing these
opportunities. During 1870-1914, the Argentine economy managed to grow at a rate of
5.9 per cent per year, one of the highest in the world economy at that time. The level of
income per capita of Argentina was 33-38 per cent per cent higher than that in Spain
and Italy (see Table 1). However, this advantage became eroded as Spain (in the 1970s)
and Italy (in the 1960s) caught-up and surpassed Argentina’s living standards.
Consequently, Argentina’s economy declined, and during 1975-2000 its GDP per capita
was on average 72 per cent of the level in Spain and 55 per cent of  the level in Italy.
In the period 1870-1914 annual net immigration to Argentina averaged nearly 57,000
people per year and the rate of net migration per 1,000 people was nearly 15 per cent
(see Table 1). Interestingly, annual net migration in the period 1900-14 went up sharply
to 103,000 per year from around 34,000 in 1870-1900.
Net immigration fell sharply in the early inter-war years (1914-29) to around 40,000 per
annum (nearly half of the number in the period 1900-14). The early inter-war years
were highly disruptive for the world economy and Argentina was not immune. World
War I interrupted the process of global integration that had developed in the first wave
of globalization. In addition, world capital markets collapsed with the war and
reconstruction was a slow, erratic process. Argentina’s access to external financing was
restricted by the disarray in world capital markets.1
                                                
1 See Della Paolera and Taylor (1997); Della Paolera (1994) and Taylor (1995).3
The 1930s were bad years for the Argentine economy: GDP growth declined to 1.5 per
cent per annum.2 Similarly to other Latin American economies, Argentina adopted an
inward-looking development strategy in the early 1930s, raising tariffs on imports of
intermediate and capital goods,3 and restricting the allocation of foreign exchange to
government-mandated priority goods. Argentina’s economic decline also sharply
reduced net European immigration flows to 22,000 per year between 1930-40, only to
resume again from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s (see Solberg 1978) after which they
virtually stopped. The human and economic devastation of World War II compelled
Europeans to leave their homes, and Argentina was a natural destination because of
previous ties and knowledge of the country gained during the earlier waves of
migration. However, as mentioned before, the rapid economic recovery in Europe in the
late 1940s and 1950s along with Argentina’s lagging economic performance during the
same period steadily reduced immigration incentive, as income per capita gaps between
Argentina and European countries were closing (see Figures 1-6).
Immigration from Europe virtually stopped in the late 1950s (see Table 6). But
coinciding with this decline, there has been an increase in migration (mainly of rural
workers and unskilled urban labour) from neighbouring countries such as Paraguay,
Bolivia and Chile (see Tables 6 and 7). Paraguayans and Bolivians generally settled in
the northern regions, while Chileans immigrants often went to work in the southern
farms and oil fields of the Patagonia. Since the 1930s, there has also been major internal
migration within Argentina from rural areas to cities that was associated with import-
substitution industrialization, the growth of government and increasing urbanization.
Thus, immigrants from neighbouring countries performed the jobs in rural areas, as
rural Argentinean workers had moved to the cities. Another important trend of the
1950s, 1960s and 1970s was the emigration of Argentineans, particularly, professionals,
high skilled people, scientists and intellectuals.4 An important reason for this emigration
of the country’s professionals—in addition to the economic decline—lies in the policies
of both the Peron administration that excluded non-peronist intellectuals and
professionals, and the open hostility of the military regimes against dissents in the
universities. This situation reached a dramatic point in 1967 under General Juan Carlos
Onganía, when 1,305 faculty members from the University of Buenos Aires alone were
expelled by government intervention (Lattes et al. 1986). Furthermore, in addition to the
direct expulsion of university professors, ‘brain drain’ followed, as intellectuals started
to leave because of the risk of being fired (or eventually imprisoned). Moreover, the
military regime initiated large budget cuts that retarded the country’s development in
research, teaching and culture.5 Following an interlude of democratic governments in
the early 1970s (see Table 3 for the succession of governments), the political situation
worsened again after the 1976 coup, when the military again led a massive deportation
                                                
2 See Della Paolera and Taylor (1997) and Diaz-Alejandro (1970) for analyses of the impact of the
1930s on Argentina and its domestic policy response: See also Di Tella and Zymelman (1973).
3 Diaz-Alejandro (1970) and Taylor (1994b) have shown that the import substitution policies adopted in
the 1930s in Argentina contributed significantly to increasing the relative price of capital goods at
home, thereby discouraging capital formation and growth.
4 See Lattes et al. (1986). See Table 5 for statistics of emigration of Argentineans to the US in the
period 1950-70.
5 The case of Cesar Milstein is telling. This outstanding Argentinean scientist emigrated from
Argentina, went to work at the University of Cambridge, and after a few years, received the Nobel
Prize.4
of scientists, professionals and students as part of its overall repressive strategy to abate
potential opposition to the military regimes of Argentina.6
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, Argentina became a country of net
emigration to the rest of the world. Macroeconomic instability (higher inflation), slow
and unstable growth in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s (partially reversed in the first half of
the 1990s) clearly changed the earlier economic motives for immigration. In addition,
the country’s political history of populist-nationalist regimes and repressive military
regimes (particularly in the late 1950s) with unstable and fragile democracy also
conspired against sustained immigration from Europe.7 Authoritarian regimes8
compelled the best qualified and, hence, more mobile Argentineans to emigrate in
significant numbers in the second half of the twentieth century (see Table 5)
2.1 Argentina’s experience with foreign migration in international perspective
Argentina’s belle époque and mass immigration coincided with a period of free trade,
free capital mobility and ample international mobility of labour in the global economy.
The prevailing monetary regime of the period was the gold standard.9 Termed by
economic historians as the first wave of globalization, this period lasted from around
1870 to 1913.10 The years were also accompanied by large flows of international
migration and became known as the age of mass migration (see Hatton and Williamson
1998). Around 60 million people migrated from resource-scarce, labour-abundant
Europe to the resource-abundant, labour-scarce countries of the new world (Argentina,
Australia, Brazil, Canada, New Zealand and the United States). Migrants came from
Europe’s ‘core’ countries such as England, Germany, France, and from ‘peripheral’
regions (e.g. the Scandinavian countries, Spain, Italy and Portugal, Poland, Russia,
Rumania and the former nations of the Austro-Hungarian empire). The main destination
country in Latin America was Argentina, but Uruguay, Cuba, Mexico, and Chile also
received a considerable number of European migrants.
World War I interrupted the process of economic interdependence and labour market
integration across countries that had characterized the first wave of globalization. The
year 1914 introduced nearly 30 years of economic instability and political turbulence:
WW I, high inflation in Europe in the 1920s, economic depression in the 1930s and
                                                
6 An empirical complication here to understand the effect of this period on migration flows, lies in the
fact that the military during the period 1976-81, largely stopped recording the outflows of
Argentineans. It is worth noting that there were also military regimes in Bolivia and Paraguay during
most of the period of emigration from these countries to Argentina.
7 Apparently, these political features did not deter immigration from Bolivia or Paraguay, countries that
also had authoritarian regimes.
8 Argentina has experienced considerable political instability and frequent change between democratic
and authoritarian regimes from the early 1930s to the early 1980s. The cycle of replacing
democratically elected governments by authoritarian regimes started with Jose Uriburu in 1930,
following the last government of Hipolito Irigoyen and ended with the military regime of General
Galtieiri in 1983, followed by democratically elected President Raul Alfonsín introducing an almost
20 year cycle of uninterrupted democracy in Argentina (see Table 3).
9 See Eichengreen (1995) for an analysis of the gold standard in this and subsequent periods.
10 See Eichengreen (1995) and Solimano (2001a and 2001b).5
WW II in the first half of the 1940s. This turbulence led to increasingly restrictive
policies for international migration in certain countries such as the US which, through
immigration quotas in 1921 and 1924, limited the flow of people from Europe. Migrants
then turned to Brazil and Argentina, and in the 1920s the latter accepted around three
million European immigrants, although as many as two million returned (see Chiswick
and Hatton 2002). At the same time, emigration restrictions were enacted in the Soviet
Union, thus reducing Russia’s share in the global migration flows to the Americas. The
Soviet experience also indicates a positive correlation between emigration pressures and
authoritarian regimes. The former Soviet Union in general suppressed exit (contrary to
Argentina during its military regimes) or controlled exit selectively as an expedient of
getting rid of political dissidents.
The post-1950 period, the so-called second wave of globalization, has been
characterized by constrained international labour markets. In fact, the increasing global
integration in goods and capital markets of the second wave was not been followed by
an equal degree of integration in international labour markets which operate under a far
more constrained immigration policy framework than the one existing until 1913. The
configuration of economic incentives for international migration to Latin America
during the twentieth century was such that an inflow of people from Europe (until the
1950s and mainly to Argentina) co-existed with an outflow from various Latin America
countries to the United States, Canada and other developed nations. It is interesting to
notice that while most migrants to the US in the nineteenth century were Europeans
(slightly over 91 per cent of total migration in the period 1820-70 and 88 per cent in the
period 1820-1920), this percentage declined to around 14 per cent in during 1971-98. In
contrast, during the same period immigration to the US originated mainly from Latin
America (46 per cent of the total, mainly from Mexico), followed by Asia (34 per cent).
Finally, another country, Ireland, also switched from net emigration to net immigration
in a century and a half or so. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, Ireland, after its
famine years, was a main emigration nation. In contrast, its rapid economic progress of
late is turning Ireland into a nation of net immigration. This is, of course, the opposite to
Argentina’s experience of becoming net emigration country instead of a net
immigration during the course of the twentieth century.
3 Issues and determinants of international migration
This section reviews the main issues regarding international migration relevant to the
purpose of this paper. The review focuses on the determinants of migration, the links
between labour market adjustment, growth and international migration, the specificities
of migration of human capital and the interactions between democracy, authoritarianism
and emigration.
3.1 Economic determinants
The economics of migration highlights the anticipation of higher incomes abroad as the
chief cause of the decision to migrate. There are, however, other variables that also
exert influence. Moreover, non-economic reasons also exist: war, ethnic discrimination,
political persecution at home, etc. The choice of the destination country is often dictated6
by the existence of a network of family and friends in a particular country.11
Specifically, the magnitude and direction of international migration are often influenced
by the following factors, some of a long-run nature and others cyclical:
i)  Per capita income or real wage differentials for a given skill level: net
immigration flows are positively correlated with the ratio between the per
capita income (or real wage) in the destination country and in the country of
origin;12
ii)  State of the business cycle and economic prospects: During periods of boom,
rapid economic growth and labour shortage in receiving countries tend to
absorb more migrants than during periods of sluggish growth and higher
unemployment (moreover, in boom periods, public attitude becomes more
favourable to immigration). In contrast, recession and reduced economic
possibilities in sending nations tend to encourage emigration;
iii)  Network effects: Empirical analyses of migration flows (Hatton and
Williamson 1998 and Borjas 2001) show that migrants tend to attach a high
value to the existence of friends and relatives in their selection of the country
of destination. In fact, family, friends and ethnic/nationals networks constitute
an important support factor for obtaining information about jobs and other
relevant national characteristics of the host nation, thus helping individual and
family adjustment after migration;
iv)  Policies toward immigration: Unfavourable migration policies in the host
countries deter immigration, albeit not completely as some illegal migration
always exists;
v)  Costs of migrating: Emigrating entails several economic and emotional costs:
travelling costs such as air tickets, shipping costs and living expenses in the
host country, as well as the costs of job search. Unskilled and poor migrants are
more affected by the economic costs of migration than high-skills migrants;
vi)  Cultural differences across countries: Language, traditions, and family
relationships affect migration patterns. As these cultural traits are often
different in the host country than in the sending nation, they tend to act as
dampening factors to international migration;
                                                
11 Migration equations usually include the following variables as determinants: the ratio between real
wage (or real per capita income) in the home country relative to the destination country, a lagged
migration variable capturing persistence effects and friends and relatives effects (social network
considerations), a two-decades lagged demographic variable representing population growth and a
variable denoting the degree of industrialization in the home country, see O’Rourke and Williamson
(2000).
12 This simple specification can be amended to include the expected real wage differentials. Empirical
evidence in the literature is reviewed in Hatton and Williamson (1998: ch 3 and 4), who undertake a
detailed discussion of the impact of wage gaps on emigration flows from Europe to new world
countries in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. The real wage gap can be replaced
by the gap of income per capita between the sending and receiving countries if migrants constitute
also human capital and entrepreneurs, whose income does not necessarily follow real wages.7
vii)  Geographical distance and proximity: In general, immigration to border
countries (or countries of proximity) tends to be higher than immigration to
countries located far away. Thus geography matters in the direction and size of
emigration flows.13
3.2 The labour market, growth and migration
Large negative economic shocks affect the labour market through different mechanisms:
a cut in real wages, an increase in unemployment, a rise in the pool of people working
in the informal sector. Most analyses often concentrate on the national characteristics of
labour market adjustment to adverse shocks such as unemployment and
underemployment. However, the international dimensions of labour market adjustment
are also important. These international adjustment mechanisms act chiefly through
migration flows in response to labour market imbalances induced by different shocks.14
On one hand, flows of emigration that reduce the domestic labour supply serve to
accommodate a decline in the demand for labour resulting from adverse aggregate
shocks. On the other hand, in periods of labour shortages and rapid economic growth,
immigration flows increase the total supply of labour, thereby easing adjustment in the
labour market. Historically, the large immigration flows to the ‘new world’ countries
(Argentina, Australia, Canada, Brazil, the US, New Zealand) in the second half of the
nineteenth century and early twentieth century were associated with labour shortages as
well as other factors such as abundance of land in the recipient countries. The labour
market has been singled-out in the literature as an important mechanism governing
migration flows.15
The relation between growth and migration can be illustrated also by the example of
European mass migration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when
migration was mainly motivated by the perception in Europe of new economic
opportunities available in the resource-rich, labour-scarce countries of the new world. In
turn, massive immigration allowed the receiving countries to mobilize their vast natural
resources, and this was the engine of their growth process.
Analytically, the causality between immigration and growth can be in two directions
(see Solimano 2001a): rapid growth, expanding opportunities, technological discoveries
and land availability in the host country often precedes immigration. At the same time,
immigration is an important factor in sustaining and reinforcing a dynamics of enhanced
growth and prosperity. Various mechanisms account for the positive effect of migration
on economic growth in receiving countries. The entrepreneurial capacities and a
favourable attitude of the immigrants towards risk-taking were an important
contribution to business creation, resource mobilization, colonization and innovation in
the new world during the first globalization era (pre-1914). Furthermore, migration can
benefit the host country by moderating the growth of wages as the labour supply
increases, therefore contributing to keeping profits high, rising the profitability of
investment and accelerating growth. These two mechanisms (the transfer of
                                                
13 See Jasso et al. (1998) and Markusen and Zahniser (1997) for analysis of immigration patterns in
terms of skill composition to the US.
14 See Solimano (1999a and 2001a); Solimano et al. (2000).
15 See Hatton and Williamson (1998) and Timmer and Williamson (1996).8
entrepreneurship and increased labour supply) operate essentially through investment-
led growth mechanisms (see Solimano 1998). An additional macroeconomic mechanism
operates through savings. As international immigration tends to raise profits by keeping
wages down and profit-earners tend to have a larger propensity to save than wage
earners, the net result is an increase in overall national savings. In a savings-constrained
economy, this should translate into more rapid economic growth for the recipient
country.
By symmetric logic, these mechanisms can induce a growth-depressing effect in the
source countries if emigrants come from relatively productive activities at home rather
than from the unemployment pool or from occupations with low labour productivity.
Emigration of highly-educated or entrepreneurially capable people can have a positive
growth effect in the recipient country and a negative growth effect in the sending
country.
3.3 Migration of human capital16
The previous discussion of the determinants of international migration is applicable to
individuals with different skills, although some factors are more relevant for the
unskilled migrant (costs of migrating, importance of network effects, cultural barriers,
etc.) than for the emigration of human capital.
The international mobility of human capital (HC) entails the movement of people with
specialized knowledge and skills in the fields of science, technology and culture. We are
referring to scientists, engineers (e.g. the information sector), executives, professionals,
artists who move across national borders. Another dimension is entrepreneurial
migration, people with talent for business creation and resource mobilization rather than
individuals with a high level of formal education. The emigration decision on the part of
scientists and professionals has some specific traits which need to be mentioned. These
people leave for a variety of reasons: the possibility of acquiring an education at the best
centres of the world (education phase), the lure of interacting with peers of international
recognition, or pursuing a successful career abroad (phase of staying abroad).
As the literature on growth and development emphasizes, the emigration of human
capital—of great relevance to Argentina—can lead both to a virtuous circle and a
poverty trap.17 Receiving countries can set in motion a cycle of vigorous knowledge
creation and application by attracting the most talented people from abroad, who
assimilate with the host country’s often-strong knowledge base. Conversely, after
outflows of talent, home countries can stagnate in the development of science,
technology and knowledge.
                                                
16 See Solimano (2002a) for an extensive discussion of emigration of human capital and its impact on
developing countries and the global economy. Earlier analyses of emigration of human capital and
brain drain are Johnson (1964), Patinkin (1964) collected in Adams (1964). More recent treatment and
empirical analyses of emigration issues are Haque and Kim (1994), Carrington and Detragiache
(1998), Sutcliffe (1998), UNESCO (2001), OECD (2002).
17 See Easterly (2001).9
3.4 Political determinants of migration: democracy, authoritarianism and
political instability
The outflow and inflow of people is not dependent on the source and host countries’
economic considerations alone. Prevailing political regimes—democracy or
authoritarianism—also affect the decision to emigrate. Individuals prefer countries
where individual and economic rights (of speech, of voice, the right to be elected to
office, etc.) are protected (e.g. in a democracy) rather than countries where these rights
are restricted. Dictatorships tend to curtail individual rights and often engage in
repressive activities.18 At an analytical level, Hirschman (1995) draws a distinction
between a purely economic choice and collective action, and identifies exit as a
predominantly economic choice and voice as a political action. In a market, if a
customer is not satisfied with the quality of a product or its price, then he can merely
‘exit’ the store and abstain from buying the item. In the realm of collective action,
people exercise ‘voice’ in an attempt to change a situation through collective action. In
turn, loyalty may lead people to avoid exit (and sometimes voice). In non-democracies,
the voice mechanism can be suppressed or become very costly to exercise, and
individuals, who are unsatisfied or discontent with current political and economic
conditions, may choose to exit their home country.19 This line of reasoning suggests a
direct correlation between the emigration of nationals (or the repatriation of foreigners)
and the existence of authoritarian regimes that suppress civil liberties. However, there
are some qualifications here. Given the costs of migrating, it is likely that professionals,
intellectuals, scientists and entrepreneurs (i.e. human capital) are more likely to
emigrate under regimes curtailing individual and economic rights than unskilled labour
who is often less mobile internationally and face financial constraints to migration.20
4 Econometric estimates of net migration equations for Argentina
In this section we present a time-series econometric analysis of a one-equation
migration model that incorporates insights of the previous discussion on economic and
political determinants of net international migration to and from Argentina:
NM(t) = a + b YPCGAP (t) + cNM(t-1) + d ECONCYCLE + e POLREGIME +
random term  (1)
with b<0, c>0 , d<0 , e<0.
The variable NM(t) represents the flow of net immigration in period t from the sending
country(ies) to the recipient country. It is often recommended that the net migration
                                                
18 See Olson (2000) for an insightful analysis of the economic consequences of democracies and
autocracies.
19 For an interesting albeit dramatic account of how the German Democratic Republic used, as state
policy, emigration of the most talented individuals during communism to get rid of active opposition
and discontent, debilitating the country and contributing to its unexpectedly rapid demise after the end
of the communist regime in 1990, see Hirschman (1995).
20 See Pellegrino and Martínez (2001); also Hansen et al. (2002) for a discussion of emigration of
scientists and professionals in the Latin American context. See Gokhberg and Nekipelova (2002) for
an analysis of emigration in the Russian context in the 1990s.10
variable be normalized by population size (i.e., rate of migration per 1,000 people or
so). The variable YPCGAP (t) in period t denotes the ratio of the recipient country’s real
GDP per capita to that of the sending country (an alternative specification often used in
the literature is to work with the ratio of the recipient country real wage relative to the
real wage in the sending country, see Hatton and Williamson 1998). Here, we work with
the GDP per capita variable as there is better availability of statistical information on
GDP per capita than real wages for the sample period of this study and also since the
migrants are not only labour, but also human capital and entrepreneurs whose income is
not necessarily derived from real wages. The coefficient of the YPCGAP variable is
expected to be positive as an increase in the ratio of GDP per capita in the destination
country relative to the home country is expected to increase the flows of immigrants.
The lagged net migration flow, M(t-1), is intended to capture persistence effects, or path
dependence, in the process of international migration.21 Path-dependence is often
associated with the relatives or friends effects already discussed in section 3. The
coefficient of this variable is expected to have a positive sign. The variable
ECONCYCLE is an index of the economic cycle in the receiving country (this also
could be extended to include economic cycles in the sending economies); capturing the
short-term prospects for employment and income in the host countries for the migrants;
the coefficient of this variable, measured as deviation of current from trend GDP, is
expected to be positive. The variable POLREGIME is an index of authoritarianism or
democracy in the recipient country. The sign of this variable’s coefficient is expected to
be negative when measured as an authoritarian regime. In other words, people are less
inclined to migrate when there is an authoritarian regime in the host country. Similarly,
nationals in non-democratic regimes may consider leaving for a given set of economic
fundamentals.
4.1 Empirical results
The model of equation (1) is estimated for Argentina by ordinary least squares
correcting for serial-correlation and testing for co-integration. In all the specifications
the dependent variable is the rate of net migration (immigrants minus emigrants per
1,000 people, see Box in the annex for details on the construction of the different
variables). The model is estimated for three periods:
i)  The period 1900-29 when large net flows of immigration came to Argentina,
mainly from Europe;
ii)  The period 1929-60 when there was a net slowdown in immigration flows;
iii)  The period 1960-99 during which emigration from Europe is replaced by
immigration from neighbouring countries. This is also a period of emigration
of professionals, scientists, intellectuals from Argentina, reflecting the
country’s economic decline, political instability and authoritarian regimes.
For the sake of completeness, we estimate the model for the entire century (1900-99). In
all specifications the dependent variable is the rate of net migration (immigrants minus
                                                
21 Another alternative is to use the stock of foreign migrants from previous years to capture network and
persistence effects.11
emigrants) per 1,000 people. The results of the estimations are reported in Tables R1-
R4.
4.2 Estimates for the 1900-29 period
The regressions for this period (reported in Table R1) show a strong significance for the
coefficient of the (log) of the ratio between the per capita income of Argentina and the
per capita income of sending European countries (the largest weights in the average
income per capita of Europe are given to those of Italy and Spain, see Box). Lagged
migration, reflecting persistence and path dependence (e.g. driven by the relatives and
friends effects) is significant in the specification of column [2] in Table R1. A variable
of cyclical output fluctuations in Argentina (log of ratio of current GDP over trend
GDP, the latter estimated by the Hodrick-Prescott filter) appears as insignificant in the
regression. The variable reflecting authoritarian political regime was not included, since
this was a period of continuous democratic regimes until 1930. The quality of the
explanatory power of the regression, R-squared is 0.76,  a reasonably good fit.
4.3 Estimates for the 1929-60 period
The regressions of Table R2 show that both lagged migration and the log of the ratio of
per capita income of Argentina with respect to the per capita income of Europe is
statistically significant in explaining the rate of net migration to Argentina in this
period. The index of cyclical output fluctuations in Argentina appears with a contrary
sign to the one expected a priori. Interestingly, the variable denoting political regimes
constructed as a dummy variable, with the value 1 for authoritarian regimes and 0 for
democracy, appears with the expected sign, i.e., negative. This supports the hypothesis
that authoritarian regimes that curtailed civil liberties (and probably property rights)
tended to deter immigration to Argentina over the sample period.22 The variable is also
statistically significant at 10 per cent significance levels in the sample period of this
regression (1929-60).
4.4 Estimates for the period 1960-99
As mentioned earlier, during the last 40 years, the main origins of international
migration to Argentina shifted from Europe to neighbour countries, chiefly Bolivia,
Paraguay and Chile (with some immigration also from Uruguay and Brazil.23 To reflect
this change in the main source countries, we replace the relative income variable of
Argentina’s GDP per capita with respect to Europe by the ratio of the log of Argentina’s
GDP per capita to the average GDP per capita of Bolivia, Paraguay and Chile. The
estimated coefficient for this variable, shown in  Table R3, is in general statistical
significant and has the expected (positive) sign. Lagged migration (one and two years)
is significant, although with the opposite sign. A bit surprisingly is the result that the
index of political regime appears as insignificant and with the wrong sign in the period
                                                
22 There were several episodes of authoritarian regimes in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s (see Table 3)
along with ‘semi-democratic regimes’ (i.e., the two Peron governments ruling from the mid-1940s to
the mid-1950s).
23 See Solberg (1978) and Tables 6 and 7.12
1960-99 when there were several military dictatorships in the 1960s and 1970s
(although not after 1983) that could be expected to deter immigration. This surprising
result may be due to two factors:
i)  Missing data on emigration during the military regimes in the later part of the
1970s. As mentioned before, statistics on immigration and emigration flows
were suspended for several years during 1976-81 when the country was ruled
by military juntas, which apparently were not very keen to show Argentina’s
emigration statistics;
ii)  When combined to the fact of missing data for the military periods, the share of
the 40-year sub-sample, which corresponds to the authoritarian regimes, is not
sufficiently large to influence the entire period.
4.5 The whole twentieth century estimates for 1900-99
The final set of regressions covering the full sample period (1900-99) is reported in
Table R4. To abstract from year-to-year fluctuations in migration flows, all the variables
used in the regressions are three-years averages. Interestingly, the ratio of Argentina’s
GDP per capita to that of Europe (the main source of migration until the late 1950s)
appears as statistically significant in the whole period.24 Lagged net migration is
insignificant and the index of political regimes (authoritarianism) appears with a
negative sign (the expected sign) and statistically significant for the full sample period,
highlighting the importance of political regimes in immigration/emigration decisions.
5 Concluding remarks
The paper has investigated the main patterns and determinants of international
migration to Argentina in the twentieth century by looking at the main economic
determinants of international migration as well as the influence of political regimes
(democracy and authoritarianism) on migration flows.
Argentina is an interesting case of a country that was one of the leading economies in
the world in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, thus attracting
massive flows of people and capital from Europe. The rate of international migration
was among the highest in the world in the early decades of the twentieth century.
However, this situation started to change in the 1930s, as Argentina was hit by world
recession and in response to the worsening external scenario, the country adopted
inward-looking import substitution policies which were in effect until the 1970s. From
the 1930s to the early 1980s, Argentina lived through alternative periods of
authoritarian regimes and democratic governments.
Consequently, due to the cumulative effects of a lagging growth and modest
development performance noticeable since the 1930s, Argentina ceased to be the
magnet it one had been for immigrants from Italy, Spain and other European countries.
                                                
24 We tried the ratio of GDP per capita of Argentina to the average of GDP per capita of Bolivia, Chile
since 1950 in the regression, but it was statistically insignificant.13
By the late 1950s, European migration to Argentina virtually stopped, and immigrants
came mainly from neighbouring Bolivia, Paraguay and Chile. At the same time, from
the latter part of the 1950s through to the early 1980s, a considerable outflow of
Argentineans left for other Latin American countries (Venezuela and Mexico) and the
US, Canada as well as Europe. Argentina’s modest and unstable growth rates as well as
the recurrent political crises during which democratic government were often ousted by
military coups that installed regimes curtailing civil rights, encouraged the emigration of
(often well-educated) Argentineans. Emigration included professionals, technicians and
scientists, a fact that gave rise to concern about brain drain. Needless to say, Argentina’s
internal circumstances also discouraged European immigration to the country.
Our econometric estimates of net migration equations to Argentina find a positive,
significant effect of the gap between the per capita income of Argentina (recipient
country) and those of the sending countries (chiefly European nations until the mid-
1950s), followed by neighbouring countries for the regressions covering the sub-periods
1900-29, 1929-60, and 1960-99.
The econometric estimates also show statistically significant adverse influence of
authoritarian regimes on international migration flows to Argentina, confirming the
importance of political regimes in the decision to migrate. To summarize, the paper
finds that the two most important variables for explaining net international migration to
and from Argentina in the twentieth century are the income per capita differential of
Argentina versus the per capita income of the source economies, and the frequency of
its authoritarian regimes.
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Annex
Box: Construction of variables
Rate of net migration
Immigration minus emigration per 1,000 people.
Argentina’s GDP per capita
Argentina’s GDP in million international 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars/Argentina’s population in thousands at
mid-year.
Europe’s GDP per capita
GDP per capita is measured in millions of international 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars/population in
thousands at mid-year.
(i) Europe’s GDP per capita (1900-29, 1900-99) = 1/3 [1/6 of GDP per capita for Austria, + for
Belgium, + for France + for Germany + for Switzerland + for UK] + 1/3 of GDP per capita for Spain
+ 1/3 of GDP per capita for Italy].
Changes in weights reflect decline in importance of Italy and Spain as sources of immigration to Argentina.
(ii) Europe’s GDP per capita (1929-60, 1960-99) = 1/8 [GDP per capita for Austria, + for Belgium
+ for France + for Germany + for Switzerland + for the UK + for Spain + for Italy].
GDP per capita for Argentina’s neighbouring countries
GDP per capita is measured in millions of 1995 dollars/population in thousands at mid-year.
GDP per capita (1950-2000) of Argentina’s neighbouring countries = 1/3 [Bolivia’s GDP per capita +
Chile’s GDP per capita + Paraguay’s GDP per capita].
Cyclical output index
Ratio of Argentina’s GDP in million international 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars divided by GDP trend for
Argentina in million international 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars.
GDP trend for Argentina was constructed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
Index of political regime
Dummy variable with the value 1 for authoritarian regime and 0 for democracy.18
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Source: GOA (1970) and CELADE.
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Rate of net migration per 1,000 [GDPpc]Arg/[GDPpc]Italy
Source: Maddison (2001), and IMF.
Source:  Maddison (2001); IMF; GOA (1970) and
CELADE.20
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Rate of net migration per 1000 [GDPpc]Arg/[GDPpc]Spain
Figure 6























































Rate of net migration per 1,000 [GDPpc]Arg/[GDPpc]OECD
Source:  Maddison (2001); IMF; GOA (1970) and
CELADE.
Source:  Maddison (2001); IMF; GOA (1970) and
CELADE.21
Figure 7
























































Rate of net migration per 1,000 [GDPpc]Arg/[GDPpc]USA Source:  Maddison (2001); IMF; GOA (1970) and
CELADE.Table 1
Argentina: Economic periods and international migration, 1870-2000
Net migration (a Argentina’s GDP per capita
Ratio to GDP per capita

















in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars in constant 1995 dollars
Global integration and rapid growth (belle époque)
1870-1900 33,962.0 11.5 3,037.8 6.2 (c 35.4 (c 0.58 1.17 1.28 0.78 na na na
1900-14 103,786.7 17.0 6,183.6 4.3 52.0 0.68 1.65 1.62 1.06 na na na
1870-1914 56,957.9 15.1 4,049.6 5.9 (c 41.6 (c 0.61 1.33 1.38 0.87 na na na
Early inter-war years
1914-29 40,436.5 4.4 9,479.9 3.8 55.7 0.59 1.53 1.32 0.99 na na na
Import substitution development strategy
1930-40 21,945.0 1.7 13,053.9 1.5 60.1 0.64 1.66 1.30 0.93 na na na
1940-50 47,752.1 3.1  15,490.5 3.7 70.9 0.47 2.01 1.65 0.94 na na na
1950-60 60,158.2 3.2 18,891.8 2.9 79.6 0.46 1.76 1.17 0.80 2.96 1.27 3.34
1960-70 32,969.3 1.5 22,277.1 4.7 95.4 0.45 1.27 0.83 0.68 3.37 1.29 3.63
1970-75 57,986.1 2.8 26,030.9 4.2 119.7 0.47 0.97 0.78 0.66 3.37 1.53 3.88
1930-75 41,268.5 2.3 18,280.7 3.3 81.4 0.50 1.58 1.19 0.82 3.19 (d 1.33 (d 3.56 (d
Early economic liberalization
1975-90 -1,387.5 -0.05 29,244.75 0.1 115.6 0.38 0.78 0.58 0.52 3.21 1.43 2.57
Intensive economic reform and liberalization
1990-2000 -2,155.3 -0.1 34.732.1 3.6 122.2 0.32 0.62 0.48 0.44 3.47 0.97 2.53
1975-2000 -1,683.0 -0.05 31,439.5 1.6 119.0 0.36 0.72 0.55 0.49 3.33 1.25 2.57
1870-2000 average 9,865.0 6.4 18,503.3 3.9 (c 44.5 (c 0.50 1.37 1.11 0.80 3.26 (d 1.28 (d 3.05 (d
Source: Solimano (2002b).














Rate of net migration
per thousand people
1870-75 12,302 2,015 6.1
1875-80 2,363 2,282 1.0
1880-85 31,970 2,602 12.3
1885-90 86,358 3,223 26.8
1890-95 16,002 3,757 4.3
1895-1900 48,968 4,316 11.3
1900-05 59,482 5,167 11.5
1905-10 157,350 6,236 25.2
1910-15 85,946 7,486 11.5
1915-20 -20,161 8,454 -2.4
1920-25 84,029 9,573 8.8
1925-30 83,952 11,124 7.5
1930-35 19,785 12,494 1.6
1935-40 23,698 13,612 1.7
1940-45 10,532 14,768 0.7
1945-50 77,483 16,197 4.8
1950-55 74,203 18,027 4.1
1955-60 42,585 19,762 2.2
1960-65 31,433 21,441 1.5
1965-70 32,737 23,114 1.4
1970-75 347,916 24,994 13.9
1975-80 -264,753 27,071 -9.8
1980-85 96,406 29,241 3.3
1985-90 143,372 31,441 4.6
1990-95 56,371 33,572 1.7
1995-2000 -82,235 35,868 -2.3
Source: GOA (1970); ECLAC; Ferenczi and Willcox (1929) and Maddison (2001).24
Table 3
Argentina presidents and political regimes, 1874-2002
President Period Political regime
Nicolás Avellaneda 1874-80 Democratic
Julio Argentino Roca 1880-86 Democratic
Juarez Celman 1886-90 Democratic
Carlos Pellegrini 1890-92 Democratic
Luis Saenz Peña 1892-95 Democratic
Jose Evaristo Uriburu 1895-98 Democratic
Julio Argentino Roca 1898-1904 Democratic
Manuel Quintana 1904-06 Democratic
Figueroa Alcorta 1906-10 Democratic
Roque Saenz Peña 1910-14 Democratic
Victorino de la Plaza 1914-16 Democratic
Hipólito Irigoyen 1916-22 Democratic
Marcelo T. de Alvear 1922-28 Democratic
Hipólito Irigoyen 1928-30 Democratic
Jose E. Uriburu 1930-32 Authoritarian
Agustin P. Justo 1932-38 Democratic
Roberto M. Ortiz 1938-40 Democratic
Ramón S. Castillo 1940-43 Democratic
Pedro P. Ramirez 1943-44 Authoritarian
Edelmiro Farrel 1944-46 Authoritarian
Juan D. Perón 1946-51 Democratic (a
Juan D. Perón 1951-55 Democratic (a
Eduardo Lonardi 1955-55 Authoritarian
Pedro E. Aramburu 1955-58 Authoritarian
Arturo Frondizi 1958-62 Democratic
Jose M. Guido 1962-63 Democratic
Arturo H. Illia 1963-66 Democratic
Juan C. Onganía 1966-70 Authoritarian
Roberto Levingston 1970-71 Authoritarian
Alejandro Lanusse 1971-73 Authoritarian
Héctor J. Cámpora 1973-73 Democratic
Raúl A. Lastri 1973-73 Democratic
Juan D. Perón 1973-74 Democratic
María E. Martinez 1974-76 Democratic
Jorge R. Videla 1976-81 Authoritarian
Roberto E. Viola 1981-81 Authoritarian
Leopoldo F. Galtieri 1981-82 Authoritarian
Reynaldo B. Bignone 1982-83 Authoritarian
Raúl R. Alfonsín 1983-89 Democratic
Carlos S. Menem 1989-95 Democratic
Carlos S. Menem 1995-99 Democratic
Fernando de la Rua 1999-2001 Democratic
Adolfo Rodriguez Saa 2001-02 Democratic
Eduardo Duhalde 2002 Democratic
Note: (a Partial, with restrictions.
Source: Available at www.historiadelpais.com.ar  .25
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1950-55 18.0 2.5 5,045.4 0.5 101.8 20.2
1955-60 19.8 3.4 5,484.6 1.7 100.4 37.2
1960-65 21.5 4.6 5,883.0 3.1 99.9 24.0
1965-70 23.1 4.7 6,749.0 3.4 112.6 21.2
1970-75 25.0 3.9 7,918.0 2.4 125.6 62.4
1975-80 27.1 1.3 8,227.8 -0.2 113.0 206.4
1980-85 29.2 -1.6 7,606.1 -3.2 123.2 335.5
1985-90 31.4 -0.9 7,097.7 -2.5 114.5 1,105.1
1990-95 33.7 4.2 7,702.6 2.9 100.5 421.5
1995-2000 35.9 3.2 8,704.3 1.9 100.0 0.5
1950-60 18.9 2.6 5,261.6 0.8 100.8 30.2
1960-70 22.3 4.4 6,303.8 2.9 105.9 22.0
1970-80 26.1 2.9 8,058.3 1.4 117.6 130.0
1980-90 30.3 -0.7 7,384.1 -2.3 117.4 724.6
1990-2000 34.8 4.6 8,243.8 3.3 100.2 229.9
Note: (a in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars.
Source: IMF (March 2002); Maddison (2001), and ECLAC database.
Table 5
Emigration of Argentinean professionals to the United States, 1950-70
Period Medical doctors Engineers Scientists Technicians Total
1950-51 10 13 na 25 48
1951-52 19 13 2 46 80
1952-53 19 34 11 60 124
1953-54 26 37 13 86 162
1954-55 20 51 11 100 182
1955-56 37 71 17 171 296
1956-57 89 135 34 232 490
1957-58 103 146 37 342 628
1958-59 70 53 17 273 413
1959-60 97 78 14 229 418
1960-61 74 77 25 267 443
1961-62 94 59 12 239 404
1962-63 116 96 36 391 639
1963-64 151 121 43 597 912
1964-65 140 88 27 496 751
1965-66 115 59 25 356 555
1966-67 126 90 31 238 485
1967-68 95 93 40 316 544
1968-69 42 42 6 221 311
1969-70 32 25 9 129 195
Source:  Oteíza (1979).26
Table 6
Origins of immigration to Argentina, 1945-64
(Five-year totals in thousands of persons)
Origins 1945-49 1950-54 1955-59 1960-64
Italy and Spain 256.3 276.1 73.9 3.9
Neighbouring countries:
Paraguay 16.1 41.1 104.2 87.1
Bolivia 1.0 6.6 31.9 62.6
Chile 8.3 23.5 9.6 39.0
Brazil 4.7 9.5 1.4 6.7
Uruguay -33.8 9.0 19.3 6.0
Subtotal -3.7 89.7 166.4 201.4
Other countries 76.3 52.8 10.1 13.0
Total 329.0 418.4 250.4 218.3
Source: Migration Facts and Factors (1970: 2).
Table 7
Immigration population from neighbouring countries residing in Argentina, 1969 (a
Population







Note: (a These statistics are the estimates of a joint mission sent to Argentina in 1969 by the
International Catholic Migration Commission and Caritas Internationalis.
Source: Migration Facts and Factors (1970: 1).27
Table R1














Log Argentina’s GDP per capita over





Log cyclical output index in Argentina (b -11.16
[-0.46]
R-squared 0.40 0.76 0.76
h of (D-W) 0.62 1.10 1.71
N o .  o f  o b s 3 03 03 0
Notes: Rate of net migration = immigration minus emigration per 1,000 people;
Method of estimation: OLS;
Values in parentheses correspond to t-statistics;
(a, (bSee Box in the Annex for the definition of these variables.
Table R2
Argentina: dependent variable: rate of net migration (per 1,000 people), 1929-60
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Index of political regime (c 0.75
[-1.70]
R-squared 0.61 0.69 0.82 0.83
h of (D-W) 2.91 2.48 1.32 1.18
N o .  o f  o b s 3 23 23 23 2
Notes: Rate of net migration = immigration minus emigration per 1,000 people;
Method of estimation: OLS;
Values in parentheses correspond to t-statistics;
(a, (band (c See Box in the Annex for the definitions of these variables.28
Table R3
Argentina: dependent variable: rate of net migration (per 1,000 people), 1960-99
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Log Argentina’s GDP per capita over





Index of political regime (d 0.60
[0.38]
R-squared 0.29 0.37 0.43 0.64 0.64 0.64
(D-W) 2.51 2.71 1.57 (e (-1) (f (0.87) (f 0.40 (f
N o .  o f  o b s 3 23 23 02 82 82 8
Notes: Rate of net migration = immigration minus emigration per 1,000 people;
Method of estimation: OLS;
Values in parentheses correspond to t-statistics;
(a, (b, (c and (d See Box in the Annex for the definitions of these variables;
(e h of Durbin-Watsin;
(f t-statistics of lagged resid(-1) education with respect to your original education +resid(1).
Table R4
Argentina: dependent variable: rate of net migration (per 1,000 people), 1900-99 (3-year averages)
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Lagged net migration (-1) 0.02
[0.18
R-squared 0.26 0.72 0.77 0.76
(D-W) 0.92 1.64 1.99 0.16 (d
N o .  o f  o b s 3 13 13 13 0
Notes: Rate of net migration = immigration minus emigration per 1,000 people;
Method of estimation: OLS;
Values in parentheses correspond to t-statistics;
(a, (b, and (c See Box in the Annex for the definitions of these variables;
(d h of Durbin-Watsin.